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Informal cooperation among farmers is a feature of most traditional 
societies, but the development of cooperatives is relatively new, with 
few existing in European agriculture before the twentieth century. By 
the eve of the Second World War the number of agricultural coopera-
tives varied greatly, both between different countries and crops (Van 
Zanden 1991, p. 237; Dovring 1956, chap. 5). This paper considers 
informal cooperation among wine producers and the establishment of 
formal wine-making cooperatives in three producing countries, namely, 
Italy, France, and Spain. In the first section I examine three major prob-
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lems facing producers between 1880 and 1950: the appearance of new 
vine diseases, the persistence of weak wine prices, and rising wage 
costs. The second section shows the response of producers, and espe-
cially how some growers were able to use new biological technologies 
to obtain significant yield increases. The third argues that rising labor 
costs and increased technical expertise required in grape and wine pro-
duction encouraged informal cooperation, not just among small produc-
ers, but also between large and small growers. The fourth shows how 
the growing economies of scale in wine production and marketing, 
together with the possibilities of improving wine quality, encouraged 
small producers to establish wine-making cooperatives. The final sec-
tion considers why, despite the apparent economic advantages of mem-
bership for most growers, the diffusion of cooperatives varied signifi-
cantly between, and within, the three countries. Access to long-term 
cheap capital, the institutional support of the church and political par-
ties, and the availability of alternative wine-making facilities is shown 
to be important. By the end of our period, cooperatives were spreading 
rapidly into new areas, in part because some of these obstacles had been 
removed, but also because the state considered cooperatives a useful 
instrument to intervene in the domestic wine market. 
LONG-RUN CHANGES IN PROSPERITY 
The lack of homogeneity among wines makes it more difficult than for 
most other agricultural products to compare prices across geographic 
regions and over time. For example, a liter of ordinary French table 
wine in London in 1873 cost just 4 percent of that of a primiere cru, a 
similar price difference to that found in Bordeaux itself. 1 The evidence 
of long-run changes in prices shown in Figure 1 therefore has to be 
taken as only approximate. In addition, the French and Italian figures 
are national prices, whereas those for Spain come from a specialized 
wine-producing area in Catalufia, and are less representative of the 
country as a whole. Cycles of high and low prices are easily visible for 
all three countries, although the timing often varied. Prices increased 
everywhere until the mid-1880s, when they began a long decline, bot-
toming out during the first decade of the twentieth century. The period 
of high prices witnessed a large growth in the production of artificial 
wines, often made from cheap "industrial" alcohol, especially sugar 
beet. The low prices of the first decade of the twentieth century saw the 
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figure 1. Wine Prices in France, Italy, and Spain 
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first serious attempts to limit the production of these "fraudulent" 
wines. Between 1901 and 1907 wine producers in the Languedoc in 
southern France sold their wines at cost price or at a loss during five of 
the seven years, and the demonstration in Montpellier in June 1907 
attracted over half a million protesters (Warner 1960, p. 18; see espe-
cially Smith 1978; Frader 1991, chap. 7). During the First World War 
prices recovered, although growers now faced increasing costs and har-
vests fell 18 percent in 1915-1919 compared to 1910-1914 in France, 
and 16 percent in Italy.2 As output recovered in the early 1920s, prices 
weakened once more. The situation worsened dramatically in the early 
1930s, and France introduced legislation to restrict new planting, pro-
ducers who had very high yields were taxed, and a number of vine vari-
eties which were responsible for the excessively large yields of poor 
quality wine were banned. During the Second World War the combined 
shortage of labor and chemicals reappeared once more, and output fell 
which allowed prices to recover. However, because many of the 1930s 
restrictions had been relaxed during the war years, the early 1950s once 
more saw overproduction, and low wine prices. 
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Table 1. Wine Production and Trade 
1880/4 1909/13 1925/29 1950/4 
Output Exports Output Exports Output Exports Output Exports 
France 33.6 2.5 58.6 2.0 56.8 1.5 58.4 2.2 
Italy 30.5 2.1 50.5 1.6 45.7 1.1 47.7 1.1 
Spain 21.2 6.9 14.9 3.1 23.6 4.1 17.9 1.0 
Total 85.4 11.5 124.0 6.6 126.0 6.7 124.0 4.3 
Exports 13.4% 5.4% 5.3% 3.5% 
as % of 
output 
Note: Figures in millions of hectoliters. 
Sources: Mitchell (1975, pp. 278-282 and 345-350). Output figurs refer to must, some of which was used 
for making vinegar. Spanish 1880/4 output refers to 1885, Antunez (1887, p. 16). 
While wine producers faced stagnant or falling real prices, important 
changes in the international wine market were also taking place. In con-
trast to the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period, when quality 
wines and spirits were an important component of European trade, our 
period saw two important changes. First, the wine trade switched from 
being one of predominantly high-quality wines to one of table wines 
and second, from the late 1890s the traditional major exporters, namely 
France, Italy, and Spain, saw their markets decline in absolute terms. 
These changes can be explained by the economic consequences of dis-
ease, especially phylloxera, and the growth in urban demand for cheap 
wines in France. Phylloxera was caused by an aphid that was trans-
ported to Europe from the New World, where many vines were immune 
to it. The speed of infection varied significantly within each country, 
but in time would destroy almost all of Europe's original vines. The 
remedy was to replant using American vines as rootstock, and then graft 
European varieties. As French domestic production slumped from its 
peak of 83.8 million hectoliters after the exceptional harvest of 1875 
(the equivalent of 219 liters per person net of foreign trade), to a low of 
23.2 million in 1889, rising prices elsewhere encouraged growers to 
increase output. The result was that between 1880 and 1892 France 
imported the equivalent of a quarter of its own wine consumption, pri-
marily from Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy.3 Even after the recovery 
of its domestic production, the international wine trade remained dom-
inated by French demand for cheap, strong wines used to blend with 
domestic ones (see Pan-Montojo and Simpson, forthcoming). But the 
wine boom for Spain and Italy did not last, as France restricted imports 
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Table 2. Changes in Relative Wages and Wine Prices 
France Italy Spain 
18705 100 100 100 
18805 76 82 
18905 118 124 
19005 184 156 134 
19105 96 139 130 
19205 142 180 288 
19305 188 344 300 
Note: Nominal wages have been divided by wine prices. 
Sources: France: wages-Levy-Leboyer (1971, Table 11, p. 490), cited in Scholliers and Zamagni (1995, 
pp. 207-209); wine prices-Ministere du Travail (1933, pp. 62-63) and Pech (1975, pp. 511-
513). 
Italy: wages-187{}-1879 taken as 1.5 lira; Arcari (1936, pp. 270-201), wine prices-ISTAT 
(1958, p. 178). 
Spain: wages-based on Gutierrez Bringas (unpublished); wine prices for Sant Pere de Ribes 
(Barcelona), cited in Balcells (1980, pp. 337-379). 
from both countries, and turned instead to its colonies, especially Alge-
ria. Algerian wine production increased from an annual average of 0.6 
million hectoliters in 1880.:...1884 to 7.9 million in 1909-1913, reaching 
15.6 million by 1950-1954. Most of this production was exported, and 
almost all to France.4 As Table 1 suggests, the combined exports from 
France, Italy, and Spain declined both in relative and absolute terms 
over the period 1880-1950. 
The decline in export opportunities implied that wine producers in 
southern Europe were increasingly dependent on their domestic mar-
kets for sales, where demand was primarily for table wines. Thus in 
Spain, for example, ordinary table wine accounted for 94 percent of 
output, fortified wines about four percent, and "quality" wines made up 
less than two percent (Ministerio de Agricultura 1933, pp. 128-129). 
However, as French per capita consumption peaked in 1920-1924 at 
168 liters/person, in Italy in 1906-1913 at 128 liters/person, and in 
Spain in 1920-1924 at 96 liters/person (Ministere du Travaill 1934, 
p. 463), demand was increasingly being driven by population growth. 
Another major feature that influenced growers' profitability was 
the rise in wages, especially from the turn of the twentieth century. 
Rising wages affected all aspects of agriculture, but viticulture was 
more labor intensive than most, and the possibilities of introducing 
labor-saving technologies limited. Whereas in France, agricultural 
nominal wages increased by perhaps 20 percent over the last quarter 
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of the nineteenth century, similar increases were much more local-
ized in Italy and Spain. However, for wine producers everywhere 
before 1900 any growth in wage costs was more than offset by the 
buoyant nature of wine prices. This situation changed quickly from 
the turn of the century, when producers were caught between rising 
wages and falling wine prices (Table 2). Although in the short term 
wine prices might rise more quickly than wages, such as during the 
First World War, in the long run labor costs increased faster. By 
1928 a day's wage in France could have bought 54 percent more 
wine than it had done in 1873, 106 percent in Italy, and 162 percent 
more in Spain. This change clearly benefited consumers, but pre-
sented a sever challenge to growers. 
THE RESPONSE OF PRODUCERS 
TO LOW PRICES AND RISING COSTS 
Vines were cultivated under such a wide variety of conditions, that to 
attempt to describe a "typical" vineyard is impossible.5 However, the 
twin problems of low wine prices and rising wage costs affected 
directly, or indirectly, all producers. So too did vine diseases, not just 
phylloxera, but also mildew and black rot, which were particularly vir-
ulent with the new American vines. Traditional pre-phylloxera viticul-
ture had consisted essentially of two inputs: land, often marginal for 
other crops, and labor. Labor requirements involved a number of basic 
skills, especially pruning, but these could be learned easily enough with 
informal education in the vineyard. New vines were planted either by 
layering (provignage), which involved burying a cane from an estab-
lished vine to the site where the new plant was required, or by planting 
directly a cutting. Entry costs of traditional viticulture were low. 
Phylloxera and other diseases raised these costs in a number of ways. 
First, by the 1920s chemicals accounted for around a fifth of annual cul-
tivation costs.6 Second, a more scientific approach was required to 
determine the best rootstock and scion to be grafted for each vineyard, 
and replanting itself saw an increase in the use of nonfarm inputs. 
Finally, although the new vines might produce higher yields, they 
required a better preparation of the land before planting and heavy use 
of fertilizers. 
How did producers of grapes, or manufactures of wine, react to these 
long-run changes in wine prices, labor costs, and vine disease? We can 
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divide their responses into four main areas. First, by switching out of 
vines into more profitable crops. Second, by using labor-saving tech-
nologies in grape production. Third, by increasing yields through 
recourse to new biological technologies. Finally, by exploiting the 
growing economies of scale in wine making and its marketing. Two 
other important areas, namely attempts to improve product quality and 
government intervention in wine markets to support prices are also 
noted briefly. We leave to the following section a more detailed discus-
sion of growers' decision making. 
Lower wine prices and rising costs, especially after phylloxera, 
encouraged some farmers to look for alternative crops. Yet in general, 
winegrowers were loath to uproot vines before their productive life had 
ended as the high costs of planting had already been paid for, the land 
was usually of poor quality, and because viticulture provided signifi-
cantly more employment per hectare than most other crops. In France 
the area of vines peaked in the pre-phylloxera period at about 2.4 mil-
lion hectares in the mid-1870s, and the area of the post-phylloxera vines 
declined slowly from 1.7 million hectares in 1900, to 1.4 million by the 
early 1950s. However, as Table 3 suggests, if Algeria is taken as an eco-
nomic extension of France, then the joint area remains very stable over 
the first half of the twentieth century. Elsewhere, the total area of vines 
in Italy remained at around 4.0 million hectares, equivalent to roughly 
1.8 million hectares when the area of vines in mixed cultivation is con-
verted into specialized viticulture, and in Spain, the area fluctuated 
around 1.4 million hectares between 1900 and 1950.7 This stability in 
the area of vines, together with the decline in wine prices, attests to the 
capacity of producers to adapt, although increasingly in the 1930s and 
1950s, with the need of the state to help distill surplus production. 
There were severallabor-saving attempts. The use of animal-drawn 
ploughs in viticulture regions was certainly not new, but was rare and 
often used with difficulty because of the high density of vines, their 
irregular planting, and the unscientific nature of pruning prior to phyl-
loxera. The need to replant after the disease allowed growers to reorga-
nize their vineyards with a view to cutting labor inputs. Fewer vines 
were planted now, but often in straight rows and sometimes the vines 
were encouraged to grow up wire trellises, which greatly facilitated the 
use of ploughs and horse-drawn hoes in the cultivation between the 
rows. The potential labor saved was considerable, and in those areas 
which could not cut costs because of the steep gradient of the land, such 
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Table 3. Area, Output, and Yields in Viticulture 
1880/4 1909/13 1925/29 1950/54 
France 
Area 2125 1597 1520 1395 
Production 33.34 46.62 56.84 56.18 
Yield per hectare 15.7 29.2 37.4 40.3 
Algeria 
Area 40 137 214 368 
Production 0.62 7.90 11.06 15.58 
Yield per hectare 15.9 57.5 51.7 42.3 
Italy 
Area 1307 1852 1808 
Production 22.48 46.02 41.19 
Yield per hectare 17.7 25.6 23.5 
Spain 
Area 1710 1278 1438 1483 
Production 21.64 14.86 23.57 17.88 
Yield per hectare 12.7 11.6 16.4 12.1 
Note: Area in thousands of hectares; production in millions of hectoliters and yields in hectoliters. 
Sources: France and Algeria, Lachiver (1988). 
Italy. MAIC (1892); MAIC (1914); ISTAT (1927). Area of mixed cultivation has been divided by 
3.6, and yields multiplied by 1.03 to compensate for grapes not pressed (i.e., table grapes). 
Spain. Simpson (1985) and Barciela (1989). 
as Priorato in Spain, vines were not replanted. The post-phylloxera vines 
were more susceptible to disease, especially mildew and black rot, and 
therefore required the use of chemicals. The development of sprays 
helped keep the rise in costs in check, but so too did row planting, which 
allowed workers to move more easily among the vines and better control 
the quantity of chemicals used. Finally, the introduction of new hand 
instruments simplified both harvesting and pruning operations. 
Another possibility was for growers to increase output. Wine yields 
are a poor indicator of technical progress because they are usually 
inversely related to quality, vary significantly over the life of the vine, 
and are difficult to measure when vines are grown among other crops. 
Despite these limitations, Table 3 shows that yields in France and Alge-
ria were higher than the other two countries and, in the case of France, 
grew over the period. In France the scientific community became split 
between those that believed growers should use European vines grafted 
onto American rootstock and those who preferred using "hybrids" or 
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"direct producers."S For good wines, there was no debate, as quality 
was only achieved by grafting. However, the vast majority of growers 
did not produce quality wines,9 and the attraction of hybrids was that 
they produced large quantities of wine, even though it was often only fit 
for blending. By 1929 one-seventh of French vines were hybrids, a fig-
ure which had grown to almost a fifth or about 300,000 hectares by the 
early 1940s. Despite government planting restrictions, the figure 
reached 31 percent of the total area of 1.3 million hectares in 1958, and 
42 percent of wine production. 10 Almost as important as higher yields, 
hybrids required far less care and chemicals than the grafted vinifera 
vines (Paul 1996 p. 100). Therefore, as Table 3 suggests, many French 
and Algerian producers sought to overcome low wine prices and 
increasing unit costs by maximizing output per hectare. 
In Italy hybrids were also introduced slowly in the north and center of 
the country, but legislation in the 1930s halted their progress, and one 
report in the late 1940s, while unable to suggest an area of cultivation, 
claimed that they did not "present a serious threat to our oenology" 
(B'OIV 1947, no. 195, p. 291). Instead, growers in Italy intercropped 
on a large scale. In 1913, for example, 76 percent of the north's vines 
were intercropped, 85 percent of vines in the center, and only in the 
drier south and islands did it fall to 12 percent (MAIC 1914). By con-
trast, in Spain the dry climate made the use of hybrids rare (B'OIV 
1950, no. 238, p. 40), yields were significantly lower that in the other 
countries, and growers in general were unable to intercrop. Instead, 
whereas in La Mancha growers competed successfully by taking low 
density-low cost viticulture to an extreme, those in more traditional 
areas of production, such as Catalufia, were less successful either at 
reducing production costs (as in La Mancha) or increasing yields (as in 
the Midi) (Carmona and Simpson 1998; Simpson 1995, pp. 208-214). 
Changes in wine making complemented these changes in the vine-
yards. Traditional wine making was simple and labor intensive. In Italy 
and Spain, for example, grapes were still crushed by treading in many 
wine districts at the beginning of the twentieth century (for Spain, see 
Elias de Molins 1904). A worker during a hard day trod between four 
and six tons of grapes, producing roughly 25-40 hectoliters of wine 
(Marcilla Arrazola 1954, pp. 69-70).11 Not only was productivity low, 
but this labor-intensive task coincided with the peak time of employ-
ment in the vineyard when labor was scarce. Labor scarcity facilitated 
the spread of cylindrical crushers in the larger vineyards from the late 
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nineteenth century. Productivity improved with Marcilla Arrazola cit-
ing a small model, worked by two men, processing 2.2 tons of grapes an 
hour, or larger, engine-powered models, between five and 10 tons 
(p. 70). A characteristic feature of the period was that it was in areas of 
cheaper wines that were at the forefront of technological change. Pro-
ducers of quality wines were slower to change, in this case because they 
feared that mechanical crushers would ruin quality (p. 70).12 
A second advantage of cylindrical crushers was their speed. To make 
good wine it was necessary to fill vats as quickly as possible, because 
the entry of newly crushed grapes might set off a secondary fermenta-
tion with the must already present. As many small producers owned 
only one or two vats, which had to serve their whole harvest, new must 
was inevitably being constantly added during the harvest. In addition, 
small producers often had to sell the must immediately after its fermen-
tation, as they lacked storage space to mature it. 13 This encouraged pro-
ducers to carry out a long fermentation in open vats. A major restriction 
to improving wine quality was therefore the need for both sufficient and 
adequate space for fermentation and maturing, and the relatively high 
investment that adequate storage implied. Although in the interwar 
period some growers in France began to experiment with a shorter fer-
mentation of five or six days, and to produce a lighter wine which was 
quick to mature (Loubere 1990, p. 89), this was not an option for many 
small producers. Indeed, many medium and small producers were 
unable to produce wine that would keep longer than the spring (Galtier 
1958, pp. 338-339). For large-scale producers, as we shall see, new 
technology allowed wines to be produced more cheaply, of a better 
quality (greater scale allowed the employment of trained chemists and 
the provision of a laboratory), and gave the owner greater bargaining 
power for the sale of wine. 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
COOPERATION IN THE VINEYARDS 
The changing technical requirements of viticulture and viniculture led 
to important changes in the organization of production in a number of 
regions. Prior to the late nineteenth century most vineyards were small 
and cultivated using unpaid family labor. Monitoring wage labor was 
costly because ploughing and hoeing too close to the plant would dam-
age the vine's roots and poor pruning not only affected yields, but could 
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also damage the vine permanently (Galas si 1992, pp. 81-82; Hoffman 
1984, pp. 315-317; Carrnona and Simpson 1999, pp. 292-293). Obvi-
ously, where wines fetched high prices, such as in the better vineyards 
of Bordeaux or Jerez (sherry), estate owners were sufficiently compen-
sated to make the use of wage labor attractive. In most places, however, 
they were not. Vines were also rarely rented, as tenants would have 
been tempted to maximize output before the end of their lease, leaving 
the landowner with a vineyard whose productive life had been signifi-
cantly shortened. In this section I argue that the weak wine prices, rising 
wages, and technical change provided incentives for informal coopera-
tion. We shall look at three areas where this occurred. First, the joint 
purchase of inputs and exchange of technical information among 
smaller growers. Second, the unequal distribution of land and the heavy 
labor costs associated with replanting vines encouraged the use of a 
wide variety of sharecropping contracts. As argued elsewhere, the effi-
ciency of sharecropping depended on adequate incentives for coopera-
tion between landowner and sharecropper (Carmona and Simpson 
1999). Finally, some large landowners found they could attract a reli-
able supply of part-time skilled labor for their vineyards by helping to 
reduce the costs for smaller family growers of the new scientific 
requirements associated with grape growing and wine production. 
The 1884 law on association in France, which removed the need for 
government consent for any association of more than 20 people, was 
designed to help trade union activities for industrial workers, but in fact 
it had its biggest impact in the countryside, with 5,146 agrarian syndi-
cates and 777,066 members existing in 1910 (International Institute of 
Agriculture [hereafter HA] 1911, pp. 256-257). Wine producers were 
quick to take advantage of the new legislation. In the first instance, dis-
ease, especially phylloxera, created major problems which growers 
could not solve individually. Syndicates collected and circulated infor-
mation among members on the best way to deal with the disease, and 
provided information and instructions on the use of new rootstock and 
grafting. A second area was the purchase of the vines, chemicals, and 
fertilizers, which benefited growers not just because bulk purchases 
were cheaper, but because the syndicate was able to check quality, 
especially important as fraud in all countries was a major problem until 
the 1920s. Finally, French syndicates helped check another form of 
fraud, namely that of the production and sale of the "artificial wines," 
which many growers believed was the prime reason for the weak prices. 
106 JAMES SIMPSON 
Later syndicates would have an important role in the running of the 
appellation contro/ees. Elsewhere, syndicates were less important than 
in France, but the same problems in wine production often encouraged 
a group response, rather than an individual one. 
Informal cooperation was also frequent among producers. In the 
Languedoc in the early 1950s it was estimated that one man and an ani-
mal could be fully employed on seven hectares of vines. Yet at this time 
about two-thirds of all vineyards, and a quarter of the region's vines 
were found on holdings of less than three hectares. Some growers had 
other land, and were thus able to find sufficient work to keep an animal. 
However, many did not, and the report concludes that it was only 
mutual aid that allowed vineyards of this size to remain viable (Etudes 
et Conjoncture 1956, p. 530). A large number of small owners would 
also benefit large growers, as we shall see later. 
In some areas sharecropping had traditionally been a convenient way 
for landlords to work their land, as the sharecropper participated in any 
increase in harvest, and therefore had an incentive to work the vines 
carefully, thereby reducing monitoring costs for the landowner. Yet 
problems of moral hazard remained, as sharecroppers might increase 
the short-term output of the vine at the expense of reducing the vine's 
commercial life, and then abandon the farm. This problem was over-
come in two very different ways. First, in the case of the rabassa morta 
in Catalufia, the vines were the actual property of the sharecropper. 
Because sharecroppers would replant the dead or dying vines, the con-
tracts were essentially indefinite until phylloxera struck in the late nine-
teenth century. The advantage for the landlord of the rabassa morta was 
that monitoring costs were nonexistent, and management requirements 
were limited to collecting the agreed share of the harvest, usually a 
third. Even after phylloxera, many contracts remained longer than the 
expected life of the vineyard. 
A second very different sharecropping model was found in Tuscany 
and elsewhere in central Italy, the mezzadria. 14 Here vines were inter-
cropped and wine was only a small part of the sharecropper's output. 
The central farm (jattoria) took cropping decisions, and management 
input was significantly higher than found in Catalufia. Contracts were 
annual, and the sharecropper was required to use all the family labor on 
his farm (podere). Problems of moral hazard and incentives were over-
come by the tradition of renewing contracts annually, although with the 
landlord retaining the right to evict sharecroppers if they wished. Both 
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of these sharecropping contracts had a long history, with the mezzadria 
being widespread by the thirteenth century, and the rabassa morta from 
the seventeenth century. Both were also essentially long-term contracts, 
and appear to have functioned well prior to the late nineteenth century. 
Then, as has been argued for Catalufia, the impact of rising wages, weak 
wine prices, and increased costs because of phylloxera reduced incen-
tives for cooperation, as landowners saw management involvement 
increase sharply, and sharecroppers saw the opportunity cost of their 
labor rise because of industrialization in neighboring Barcelona (Car-
mona and Simpson 1999, pp. 303-312). In Tuscany there was also 
unrest, with strikes over who should pay for the chemicals that the vines 
now required (De Simone 1979; Radi 1962). Yet the ability of Tuscan 
landowners to improve product quality and promote the chianti brand 
name in regions best suited to the vine (the Chianti Classico area was 
redefined in 1932), or direct resources to other more profitable crops 
elsewhere suggests greater flexibility than in Catalufia, where vines 
were intercropped with difficulty, and the most successful diversifica-
tion away from table wines to cava, a sparkling champagne, still 
accounted for less than 1 percent of all output in the early 1930s. But 
high labor costs, weak farm prices, and the growing capital require-
ments in viticulture now produced tensions in both societies. 
Conflict in Catalufia and Tuscany was caused in part because the suc-
cess of sharecropping in previous periods created expectations for both 
landowner and sharecropper that were more difficult to realize with the 
new conditions after phylloxera. However, elsewhere, such as in 
Campo de Carifiena and Navarra in Spain, the new conditions provided 
incentives for landowners to offer sharecropping contracts to landless 
laborers, apparently for the first time (Jaen 1904, p. lO4; Sabio 1995, 
pp. 174-180, 219-220). Replanting after phylloxera required large 
quantities of labor to clear the old vines and prepare the land for the new 
ones and, despite the greater capital needs associated with the new 
vines, viticulture remained labor intensive. Sharecropping was also 
widely used in the rapid growth of extensive viticulture on large farms 
which had previously been used for extensive cereals or poor grazing in 
La Mancha (central Spain) and Puglie (southern Italy). Both areas ben-
efited from low-cost land and labor, and the railways significantly 
reduced their distance from major urban markets. In La Mancha the 
very dry climate led to low yields, but also reduced the risks of vine dis-
eases, making chemicals unnecessary in most years. The area of vines 
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increased from around 170 thousand hectares in the late 1880s, to 375 
thousand hectares by the early 1930s.15 In Puglie the area of vines 
increased from 134 thousand hectares in 187911883 to 282 thousand in 
1913, a figure which was maintained in the early 1950s. 16 Like La 
Mancha, land ownership was concentrated, and contractual conditions 
for sharecroppers varied, depending on the relative scarcity oflabor and 
the price of wine. 17 Thus, for example, the appearance of phylloxera 
and the collapse of wine prices in the late 1880s saw many contracts 
come to an end, but new ones, often more attractive to the sharecropper, 
appeared in their place (Inchiesta Parlamentare 1909, p. 445). However, 
sharecroppers in Puglie were usually only part time, and their main 
income came from working as wage earners on the large estates 
(p. 436). Although it is not clear what percentage of vines were worked 
using sharecroppers, the system in Puglie appears to have also helped 
keep a skilled, local wage labor force available for larger farmers, a role 
played by small property owners in the Languedoc. 
In the Languedoc large landowners preferred capital-intensive, high-
yield viticulture, using wage labor rather than sharecropping. Even 
before phy lloxera there had been a move to expand wine production on 
the fertile plains that increased yields, but at the cost of a decline in 
quality. This process increased significantly after phylloxera, with the 
use of such grape varieties as Aramon. But high yields required heavy 
labor inputs, which was made easier by the fact that the traditional high 
monitoring costs found in viticulture were slowly being reduced. First, 
and following the work of Guyot, the new vines of the plains were 
planted in straight lines and trained to grow up wire trellises. As Guyot 
(1861, p. 19) wrote, not only did this make it considerably easierto cul-
tivate the vines, but: 
A simple glance along the line of vines, permits the owner to spot the skill or the 
negligence of his vinedressers, just as the foreman can control with the same ease 
the quantity and quality of work of each of his workers. 
Second, pruning knives which, unless kept very sharp often tore the 
vines, were replaced by the secateur from the late nineteenth century 
(Loubere 1978, p. 83; Frader 1991, p. 31). Finally, and as Pech has 
shown, landownership over the period became increasing concentrated 
in two different sizes: estates of 40 hectares or more, and those of less 
than 10 hectares. Large estate owners reduced monitoring costs of wage 
labor, not just by redesigning their vineyards as Guyot encouraged, but 
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Table 4. French Cooperatives and Long-term Borrowing, c. 1910 
No. of cooperatives No. with long-term loans 
Cheese making, dairies, and butter 2,485 53 
Wine 39 31 
Starch 34 2 
Collective purchase/use of 
agricultural machinery 23 15 
Oil mills 20 9 
Distilling 17 13 
Others 42 5 
Notes: Figures for the number of cooperatives and membership are only approximate, as there was often 
a delay between their formation and the start of production, and those cooperatives which ceased 
activity often remained active for a number of years in the official figures. 
Sources: IIA (1911, pp. 277 and 281). 
also by increasing incentives for good work. In the first instance, grow-
ers with not enough land to employ their whole family fully, found 
skilled employment on the estates that might be repeated indefinitely on 
an annual basis if done well. In addition, landowners were sometimes 
willing to let skilled vinedressers work a six-hour day, finishing at two 
or three 0' clock each afternoon so that they could work their own vines 
(Smith 1975, p. 365). A second area of incentive for good work was the 
provision by large producers of technical knowledge, for example, by 
allowing workers to remove suitable rootstock for their own vineyards, 
or proving small growers work in their vineyard in exchange for the use 
of their wine-making facilities (Frader 1991, p. 36). Therefore, the 
changing nature and growing capital requirements of wine production 
helped large owners to bargain more effectively for labor, thereby off-
setting, at least in part, the rising wages. 
THE GROWTH OF COOPERATIVES 
In France, societies for the collective manufacture of cheese-the 
"fruitieres", supposedly date from the twelfth century.I8 As Table 4 
shows, cheese making remained by far the most common of producer 
cooperatives on the eve of the First World War. This was hardly sur-
prising as they were relatively small, and required limited quantities of 
capital. The first French wine cooperative appeared in 1901 at Mudai-
san, and was quickly followed by another at Maraussan, both in Herault 
(Languedoc) (Lachiver 1988, pp. 482-483). The law of December 29, 
1901 (together with the decrees of May 30 and August 26, 1907) 
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Table 5. Growth in Wine-making Cooperatives in Italy, France, and Spain 
Number of Number of Capacity Wine produced % of wine 
cooperatives members (ODDs hI) (ODDs hI) harvest 
Italy 
1924 (a) 80 
1928 (b) 84 10,732 1,200 1,000 
1931 (c) 98' 12,481 917 857 
1932 (c) 128 15,909 1,220 958 
1938 (d) 147 18,820 1,566 934 
1951 (e) 161 
* plus 1 7 more in construction. 
France 
1908 (f) 13 120 
1914(g) 79 
1920(f) 92 1,000 
1929 (f) 630+ 
1939(f) 827 12,000 
1943 (f) 852 142,000 14,480 
1952 (e) 1,023 214,306 20,904 13,461 25.4% 
+ 464 were wine cooperatives, and 252 distilleries. 
Spain 
Early 1920s (h) 50-60 
1951 (e) 215 60,000 1,500 
1953 (e) 263 2,422 12.8% 
Sources: (a) Marchesi, 1925, pp. 81-84. 
(b) IIA, 1931, p. 39. 
(e) ISTAT, various years. 
(d) ISTAT, 1940. 
(e) B'OIV 1955, no. 290. 
(f) B'OIV 1952, no. 254. 
(g) Lachiver, 1988, p. 482. 
(h) Rivas Moreno, n.d., p. 280. 
allowed agrarian cooperatives of production and sale access to long-
term credit at the almost uniform rate of 2 percent interest over 25 
years. Capital was provided by the state, but lent through regional credit 
banks, who were responsible for the loans. Local banks did the monitor-
ing therefore, but transaction costs were greatly reduced because coop-
eratives were required to establish a specific legal structure if they 
wished to receive loans. 
Access to long-term credit was certainly not the only, or even the 
principle reason, for the founding of these early cooperatives. Many 
were strongly influenced by socialist ideology, and were seen as a solu-
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tion to the extremely low wine prices between 1900 and 1907. It was 
under these conditions that "les vignerons libres de Maraussan" estab-
lished a producer's cooperative to sell wine to consumer cooperatives in 
Paris. But as early as 1906 the members had constructed and equipped 
a modern cooperative winery, which had an initial capacity of 15,000 
hectoliters, at a cost of 175 thousand francs. The Ministry of Agricul-
ture contributed 30 thousand francs, the local regional bank (under the 
1906 law) provided a long-term loan of 109 thousand francs, and a fur-
ther 30 thousand francs was raised from consumer cooperatives in 
Paris. The subscription of the 120 members was just 25 francs each 
(Gide 1926, pp. 129-131). The example of Maraussan provides two 
important insights, namely the contribution that ideology, in this case 
socialism, can play in setting up a simple wine cooperative, and the very 
high capital costs involved in constructing a large, modern winery. 
Although the low wine prices between 1900 and 1907 encouraged the 
formation of cooperatives-the "filles de la misere," Table 5 shows that 
numbers continued to grow steadily throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century, with only a temporary halt during the two world 
wars. By the time of the economic crisis of the early 1930s, coopera-
tives numbered 630, significantly more than in either Italy or Spain. 
The severe difficulties of the early 1930s saw a number of attempts at 
state intervention in the wine market (Warner 1960, chaps. 6, 7, 8), and 
cooperatives were seen as a useful instrument for policy implementa-
tion. By the early 1950s cooperatives produced about a quarter of all 
French wines, a figure that reached over half in the south. 19 
The French experience was not matched by either Italy or Spain. In 
both countries the first wine cooperatives predated those of France. In 
Italy a cantina sociale was established at Bagno a Ripoli, near Florence 
in 1888, and by 1910 there were reported "slightly in excess of 150.,,20 
But most cooperatives were short lived, and in 1924 numbers were 
down to 80, before recovering to 128 in 1933, and just 1.3 percent of 
wine production (lSTAT 1933, pp. 145 and 147). We shall comment 
later on why this initial growth ofItalian cooperatives faded so quickly. 
In Spain it was claimed that there were 215 wine cooperatives and 19 
distilleries in 1952, with a total membership of 60 thousand growers, 
and producing about 1.5 million hectoliters, or 10 percent of national 
output (B'OIV 1952, no. 253, p. 63). In Spain, as in France and Italy, 
the number of wine cooperatives was increasing very fast in the early 
1950s, but these figures probably include a number whose wine making 
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facilities were still under construction. Furthermore, even if the produc-
tion figures are correct, the early 1950s harvests were exceptionally 
low. Prior to the 1936-1939 civil war, wine cooperatives in Spain were 
probably well below a hundred. 
Wine cooperatives, were established for three distinct activities: the 
crushing, fermenting, and pressing of grapes; the maturing and selling 
of wines; and the processing of the wine lees-the remains of the grapes 
after they had been crushed to make both spirits and tartic acid. These 
activities suggest five economic reasons why small growers were 
attracted to setting up a cooperative. 
In the first instance, there were economies of scale in wine making, as 
we have already noted. These economies became increasingly apparent 
as the period progressed. By the early 1950s the average size of a wine 
cooperative was 15,000 hectoliters, costing 60 million francs, a figure 
well beyond the means of medium-sized producers (B'OIV 1954, no. 
283, p. 49; Galtier 1958, pp. 338-339). The greatest economies were 
achieved not in the production of quality wines, but with table wines, 
where large quantities could be pressed and matured together. There 
were, however, limits to the economies of scale, even with table wines. 
For example, one of the major problems during fermentation was the 
need to control temperature. If vats were too large, then the wine 
became too warm and the fermentation process stops. In general, 300 
hectoliters were considered about the maximum, although concrete 
vats, which absorbed more heat than wood, might be slightly larger. In 
one very large private winery in Aude (Languedoc) with a capacity of 
1,400 hectoliters a day, fed from 215 hectares of vines and producing 
30,000 hectoliters of wine, 20 fermenting vats, each with a capacity of 
around 350 hectoliters were used.21 In fact, the first half of the twenti-
eth century probably saw a reduction in the size of vats, as the fermen-
tation process became better understood (B'OIV 1952, no. 254, p. 43). 
Likewise, there were also limits to the size of the maturing vats. There-
fore, according to one report, unit capital costs of a simple winery of 15 
thousand hectoliters were the same as one with a 175 thousand capacity 
(p. 41).22 By contrast, unit operating costs oflarger wineries were often 
lower, and one cooperative in 1950 which processed 152 thousand hec-
toliters, used only 40 percent of labor per hectoliter than a much smaller 
one of 11 thousand hectoliters. Another study shows the cost of wine 
making in 12 cooperatives in 1949 varied between 78 and 169 francs 
per hectoliter (both cited in Galtier 1958, p. 377). In part, cost compar-
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ison is made difficult because of the treatment by cooperatives of inter-
est and depreciation in their accounting. However, and in conclusion, 
although economies of scale no doubt were a factor in the decision in 
establishing a cooperative, the fact that wine making represented only 
between 3 and 8 percent of the final price suggests it was probably not 
crucial (p. 377). 
Perhaps more important than cost savings was the improved quality 
and consistency of wines produced by better management and technical 
skills. The scientific knowledge concerning the nature of wine and the 
problems associated with its making and storing increased significantly 
after the publication of Pasteur's major work in 1864. Although techni-
cal debates on such issues as the ideal fermentation time, or the best 
way to treat a wine that had become unstable would continue, the tech-
nical equipment and skills required in viniculture if drinkable wine was 
to be consistently produced had by the early twentieth century, if not 
before, moved well beyond what the majority of grape producers could 
either understand, or carry out. As Galtier notes, cooperatives created a 
new type of professional-a manager who was both an oenologist and 
who could also attend to the legal and commercial sides of the business. 
At first, a respected member of the community often directed the tech-
nical processes, but increasingly the larger cooperatives looked for 
trained agronomists, and especially oenologists. In France, from 1939, 
the Ecole Nationale d'Agriculture in Montepellier started annual 
courses specifically for cooperative technicians (p. 376). Quality wines 
could, and indeed were, produced in cooperatives. The fact that fer-
menting vats were about 300 hectoliters allowed medium-sized produc-
ers the possibility to use the superior technology (and scientific 
knowledge) available in the cooperative, but keep their wines separate 
from the rest. After fermentation, the wines were collected from the 
cooperative and matured in their own private cellars. 
Economies of scale in marketing were a third advantage. Cooperative 
members had better access to urban markets by producing large quanti-
ties of a standardized wine under scientific conditions, than by trying to 
sell their own production individually. Pech notes how one giant private 
producer with facilities to produce 100 thousand hectoliters, the 
Compagnie des Salins du Midi (C.S.M.) received on average 19.25 
francs per hectoliter in the period 1893-1913, against a regional aver-
age of 16.00 francs. By contrast Gelly, a small producer in the same 
region who produced little more than 400 hectoliters, received 27 per-
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cent less than the C.S.M. during the period 1893-1906. Of greater 
importance, in years of low prices the difference was even greater, with 
Gelly being paid only 4.8 francs in 1904 against 11.5 francs, received 
by the C.S.M. (Pech 1975, p. 158). As noted above, the Maraussan 
cooperative was initially established for the sale of wines, rather than 
their production. Finally, although higher prices were achieved in part 
because cooperatives postponed the sale of the wine (and thereby 
avoided the low prices common immediately after the harvest), mem-
bers were usually able to obtain loans from the cooperative as soon as 
they handed over their grapes. 
A fourth advantage was that cooperatives reduced a farmer's labor 
requirements by increasing capital, a feature not usually considered 
necessarily beneficial on small, family farms. However, because labor 
was saved at the harvest time when family resources were fully 
stretched, it often reduced the growers' need for wage labor, rather than 
making family labor idle. Furthermore, the fact that growers no longer 
fermented all their grapes in a single vat, which required the harvest to 
be collected as rapidly as possible, further reduced the need to employ 
wage labor (Galtier 1958, p. 340). 
Finally, cooperatives were established for processing the remains of 
grapes after wine making. Small producers had often traditionally pro-
duced spirits themselves, but new technology allowed cream of tartar to 
be produced. 
WHAT EXPLAINS THE SUCCESS OR 
FAILURE OF WINE COOPERATIVES? 
In the previous section we saw that the growth of cooperatives varied 
between countries. Of particular interest is the Italian case where, after 
an early rapid growth, numbers then declined. For the historian, even 
more difficult than establishing with certainty the number of coopera-
tives and their membership in any single year, the question is whether 
numbers changed because new cooperatives came into operation, or 
because old ones disappeared. For Italy it is possible to illustrate the 
short life of many of the early cooperatives in a little more detail. In 
1904 the government established a fund of 700,000 lire to encourage 
the modernization of wine-making facilities, and the report published in 
1908 gave details of 33 cooperatives which successfully took part. Of 
these 33 cooperatives, only 12 were still active 25 years later in 1929.23 
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By 1958 of these surviving 12, three were still definitely operational 
(Oleggio and Mombaruzzo in Piemonte, and the Cantina Sociale delta 
Pioppa at Carpi in Emilia), and another five perhaps working.24 Of the 
remaining four, three were not mentioned in the 1958 survey and the 
fourth, Soave (in Verona) is shown as having started in 1930, with the 
original one presumably having ceased to operate. Therefore, our sam-
ple of 33 in 1908 was severely depleted by the late 1920s, which sup-
ports contemporary opinion that Italian cooperatives found it difficult 
to remain active for very long (Gide 1927, p. 92). 
What explains the differences in the success of cooperatives, both 
between different countries and within them? In the first instance, 
access to capital was critical. Most writers argue that the long-term, 
low-interest loans provided by the French government were a major 
incentive for growers to set up their cooperative. As we have noted, the 
state provided directly or indirectly four-fifths of the capital require-
ments for the Maraussan cooperative in 1906, a figure which was simi-
lar at the end of our period.25 In addition, the state provided free 
technical information on the construction and equipping of the cooper-
ative and favorable tax conditions. These advantages which French 
wine producers enjoyed can best be appreciated by looking at the situa-
tion in Italy and Spain. In Italy the lack of government-backed loans 
implied that capital was difficult for cooperatives to obtain and expen-
sive, and was frequently cited for their slow growth in the 1920s (for 
example, Gide 1926, pp. 94-95). In Valencia in Spain the small grow-
ers in Utiel had to wait 22 years before they were able to construct their 
own winery, while in neighboring Requena, cooperative members 
themselves constructed the building over a three-year period (Piqueras 
1981, p. 270). One recent study of the pre-civil war period in Spain con-
cludes that, although the financial obstacles to establishing coopera-
tives were not the only ones, they were decisive (Pan-Montojo 1994, 
p. 361). But in both countries the situation by the early 1950s had 
improved significantly. In Italy the law of 1931 provided three million 
lire of state money for non-repayable grants of up to 20 percent of long-
term investment for new cooperatives, and 15 percent for improve-
ments in those already in operation, and loans also became easier to 
apply for. The 1952 law provided conditions not so different from those 
in France, with state-backed loans of up to 75 percent of capital expen-
diture, at 3 percent interest (B'OIV 1955, no. 290, p. 49). In Spain, by 
the early 1950s, the Ministry of Agriculture was also providing loans of 
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up to 80 percent of the capital cost of cooperative installation, over a 
10-year period and at 2.5 percent interest (B'OIV 1952, no. 254, p. 32). 
A second factor in explaining the different rates of growth of cooper-
atives is ideology. Small growers often faced high transaction costs, 
both in organizing among themselves and in the practicalities of estab-
lishing the cooperative winery. These could be reduced by the presence 
of outside agents. In France the early success of many of the small 
cooperatives in the south, and in particular in Var, is attributed to the 
role played by socialism. Furthermore, as the Catholic Church was also 
very active in some areas, competition between the two helped bring 
material benefits to cooperative members (Cleary 1989, p. 46). By con-
trast, in Italy one of the chief weaknesses of the cooperative movement 
as a whole was "the rapid and excessive multiplication of societies hav-
ing the same aims and, inevitably, competing with each other" (Lloyd 
1925, p. 2). By the early 1920s there were three main groups-the Lega 
Nazionale delle Cooperative (socialist), the ConJederazione Coopera-
tiva Italiana (Catholic), and the Sindicato Italiano delle Cooperative 
(fascist) (Cotta 1935, pp. 4-5). With the coming to power of the fascists 
in 1922, cooperatives were reorganized into a single body, L'Ente Nazi-
onale Fascista dell Cooperazione. The closure of many socialist coop-
eratives explains, at least in part, the stagnation of the movement in this 
period. By contrast, in Spain, it was the Catholic Church that provided 
the ideological stimulus and institutional framework for the cooperative 
movement, accounting for about 90 percent of the total in 1919 (Gar-
rido 1996, p. 61). But although membership reached over half a million 
by the early 1930s, few cooperatives had facilities to process farm prod-
ucts (Garrido 1996; Pan-Montojo 1994, pp. 361-365; Simpson 1995, 
pp. 228-231). By contrast, the socialist party's interest in agriculture 
was limited to the landlessjornaleros. 
The significant variations in the regional concentration of coopera-
tives suggest that there were factors other than just access to long-term 
capital, or the organizational capacity of outside agencies. By the early 
1950s, 71 percent of all French cooperatives were found in the south, 
attracting over half of all growers. In Italy 83 percent of cooperatives 
were in the north, and in Spain, 79 percent were found in the Mediter-
ranean and Navarra. It is perhaps not surprising to find cooperatives in 
regions where viticulture was of importance. However, and what has to 
be explained, is why cooperatives were rare in some major wine-pro-
ducing areas. One argument is the supposed opposition from commer-
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cial wineries. Growers, it is argued, were underpaid for their grapes 
because commercial wineries had excessive market power, and faced 
opposition when they tried to establish their own cooperative. Although 
it is unlikely that established private wineries would welcome competi-
tion, it is difficult to prove that they systematically were able to distort 
local markets, or successfully stop the establishment of cooperatives. 
Indeed the limited evidence suggests that their influence was probably 
small. 
It is true that before motor transport reduced the problems of distance, 
and except in villages with a heavy concentration of vines, most grow-
ers would have had a limited number of commercial outlets for their 
grapes.26 However, and in contrast with the Danish cooperative dairies 
of the late nineteenth century, there appears to have been limits to pri-
vate wineries market power. The creation of a specific asset (the win-
ery) implied that the owner was as dependent on an adequate supply of 
grapes, as the grower was to find a market. Furthermore, because grow-
ers could be paid by both the quantity and sugar content of their grapes, 
the problems of asymmetric information which gave cooperatives an 
important competitive advantage in the manufacture of Danish butter 
were considerably less in wine making.27 But, as we have seen, large 
wineries were often able to obtain higher prices than small producers, 
especially in periods of overproduction. It was in periods of overpro-
duction and low prices, rather than market abuse on the part of private 
wineries, which was behind the large wave of cooperatives that were 
founded in the early 1900s and early 1930s. 
The geographic distribution of cooperatives prior to the Second 
World War reflects to a certain extent farm size and land ownership pat-
terns, which might suggest political opposition to them was greater in 
certain areas. A successful cooperative was likely to be found in a vil-
lage with both a sufficient volume of grapes, and fragmentation of land 
ownership. In France in 1951 the average cooperative had a capacity of 
20 thousand hectoliters, and a membership of 209, producing about 100 
hectoliters each (Table 6). Yet within the country there were important 
differences. In particUlar, cooperative members in the Languedoc were 
smaller growers (56% growers, producing only 26% of the wine), 
whereas in the "rest of France," they were well above average size (3% 
of the total, producing 23% of the wine). In the "rest of France" coop-
eratives had fewer members (164 members against 212 in the Langue-
doc), but each produced over twice as much wine (119 hectoliters 
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Table 6. Regional Distribution of Wine Cooperatives, Early 1950s 
% of growers 
in % of wine produced 
No. of cooperatives cooperatives in cooperatives 
A. FRANCE, 1951 
Languedoc-Roussillion 521 56.1 
Lower Rhone 181 53.1 
Gironde 61 14.2 
Rest of France 223 3.0 
TOTAL 986 13.0 
B. ITALY, 1952-1953 
No. of cooperatives % of total 
North 172 82.7 
Center 10 4.8 
South 17 8.2 
Islands 9 4.3 
TOTAL 208 100.0 
C. SPAIN, 1952 
Andalucia 5 2.3 
Northern Spain 1 0.4 
Castilla, Leon & Extremadura 6 2.8 
Castilla-La Mancha 26 12.1 
Upper Ebro 50 23.3 
Aragon 4 1.9 
Mediterranean 122 56.7 
Canary Islands 0.4 
TOTAL 215 99.9 
Sources: France: B'OIV, 1954, no. 283, pp. 46-47. 
Italy: B'OIV, 1955, no. 290, p. 47 and ISTAT, various years. 
Spain: B'OIV, 1955, no. 290. 
26.4 
56.0 
21.0 
22.8 
28.0 
% of nation's wine 
produced in region 
40.3 
23.0 
25.1 
11.6 
100.0 
12.5 
9.4 
17.1 
21.7 
6.3 
3.2 
29.6 
0.2 
100.0 
against 53). Infonnation of individual production within a cooperative 
is unfortunately scarce. In Vergeze (Languedoc) average production 
was 112 hectoliters, but over half the members contributed less than 50 
hectoliters each, compared to 12 percent who were responsible for half 
of total output, at an average of 485 hectoliters per member. This sug-
gests that although cooperatives might attract large numbers of small 
part-time growers, half the production was provided by full-time pro-
fessional grape growers. 
Cooperatives were rare in both Puglie and La Mancha. The relatively 
low yields of these regions implied that a cooperative of 15,000 hecto-
liters required a feed area of approximately 1,000 hectares in La Man-
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cha or 715 in Puglie in the early 1920s.28 Sharecropping, as we have 
seen, was an important feature in the rapid growth of viticulture in both 
these regions, but sharecroppers had little capital, and it was left to land-
owners and wine merchants to construct the wine-making facilities. 
Likewise in the traditional sharecropping region of Tuscany, it was the 
central farm-the Jattoria-which made the wine. For sharecroppers, 
the temporary nature of their contracts was another obstacle for the 
long-term investment in a cooperative. The cantina sociale in Piumazzo 
(Modena) tried to overcome this problem by having two types of mem-
bers: permanent ones (soci effectivi), who could only leave the cooper-
ative if they sold their land (or in other, strictly defined circumstances), 
and annual members (soci annuali)-sharecroppers who could use the 
cooperative facilities, but who played a very limited role in the admin-
istration (Clique 1931, pp. 246-247). But in general, cooperatives were 
late to appear in those regions where sharecropping was found. In 1950 
there were still no wine cooperatives in Tuscany, despite the region pro-
ducing about a tenth of the nation's wine. Catalufia was a notable 
exception, although in this region, contracts were for several decades 
giving sharecroppers' greater stability to make the long-term commit-
ment that cooperative membership required. 
Another explanation was wine quality. Most producers used a num-
ber of vine varieties, and the final product of each grower was different, 
depending on the mix of grapes. Although one of the attractions of 
cooperatives was their ability to produce a standardized product, they in 
general found it hard to price grapes other than by their sugar content. 
One possibility, common in Italy during the 1920s or with some of the 
middle-quality Bordeaux wines in the 1930s and 1940s, was for grow-
ers to bring only part of their harvest to the cooperative, and press at 
home or sell to private wine producers, those grapes which they felt 
produced the best wine (Clique 1931; Roudie 1994, p. 282). However, 
if this helped overcome the problem of the diversity of grape varieties 
in a region, it had two obvious negative consequences. First, growers 
who only used the cooperative for perhaps half their production would 
have less interest in its long-term success. Second, it was the poor-qual-
ity wines made from the least desirable grapes, which was considered 
one of the major weaknesses of the Italian cooperatives in this period 
(Berget 1925, cited in Clique 1931, p. 241). Growers looked to cooper-
atives as an outlet for their poor-quality grapes, a fact encouraged by 
governments which enforced compulsory distilling of surpluses in the 
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early 1950s. Grape variety also helps to explain the high density of 
cooperatives in the Languedoc, where they had become more standard-
ized than in most other regions, with the aramon (red wines) and 
clairette (white) predominating (Gide 1927, pp. 92-93). 
A final factor was clustering. Cooperatives, at least prior to the Sec-
ond World War, were in general found around a major center of com-
mercial viticulture in each country, namely the Languedoc, Piedmonte, 
and Catalufia. After the first few cooperatives were established, each 
region used its major wine journals, wine research centers, specialist 
equipment producers, and so on to help in the diffusion of the coopera-
tive concept.29 To reinforce this, regional federations were founded 
whose aim, among others, was quite naturally to establish more cooper-
atives. Even when national associations appeared, meetings and confer-
ences tended to be held in those areas where the concentration of 
cooperatives was already high. This did not make it impossible for 
cooperatives to develop in new areas. However, when the Compagnie 
jerroviaire d'Orleans wanted to encourage producers in southwestern 
France to build cooperatives, it had to organize visits for prospective 
members to the Burgundy, to see one in operation (Roudie 1994, 
p.276). 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown how, in the face of adverse wine prices and rising 
production costs, grape and wine producers looked not just to new tech-
nologies, but also to formal and informal cooperation as a means of 
remaining competitive. Although it is the large wineries that are the 
most visible source of cooperation among growers, this paper has tried 
to place equal emphasis on other informal cooperation. Contracts often 
proved remarkably adapt at changing to different circumstances, and 
informal and unwritten contracts of a wide nature existed, both helping 
landowners secure adequate skilled labor at cheaper rates, and for 
smaller, sometimes illiterate growers, to capture some of the benefits of 
the scientific revolution through which viticulture was passing. 
Cooperative wineries provided access for small and medium-sized 
producers to the rapidly improving scientific knowledge of wine 
making, together with equipment that was far beyond their means to 
obtain privately. Cooperatives also improved growers' bargaining 
power for selling the wine. However, without access to long-term 
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credit, it was difficult for cooperatives to be established. By the end 
of our period the movement was entering a new phase in France, 
with wine cooperatives being used by the state to help coordinate 
intervention in the wine market, both by limiting the types of vines 
used by growers, and by controlling the release of wine onto the 
national market. The extent by which these forms of cooperation 
among producers were efficient is more difficult to measure. With-
out the formal and informal cooperation shown in this paper, there 
can be little doubt that the speed of the rural exodus would have been 
faster both before and after 1950. But wine cooperatives appear to 
have competed among themselves and prices, if not wine quality, 
moved in a favorable direction for consumers in all three countries. 
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NOTES 
l. The Wine Trade Review, cited in Pan-Montojo and Simpson (forthcoming) and 
Roudie (1994, p. 36), who notes that a leading Medoc sold for around 22 times that of 
a Saint-Macaire, Blaye, or Bourg in 1840. 
2. In Spain, which was recovering from phylloxera, output increased by a third. 
The 1915 harvest everywhere was especially small on account of climatic conditions 
and the lack of chemicals for growers to protect their vines against mildew. 
3. Production averaged 29.5 million hectoliters, exports 2.4 million, imports 9.7 
million, and consumption 36.8 million (Ministere du Travail 1934, pp. 179-180). By 
contrast, between 1868 and 1878 average domestic production was 55.5 million hecto-
liters. 
4. For example, in 1925-1929 average production was 11.1 million hectoliters, of 
which 8.1 million were exported, and 97.6 percent of this figure went to France (Ferrara 
1931, pp. 114-115). 
5. Marescalchi (1924, pp. 5-12), for example, found significant differences in pro-
duction costs in Italy in the early twentieth century. 
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6. The exact amount naturally varies significantly between vineyards. A figure of 
18 percent was given for Tarragona (Spain) in 1921 (lnstituto de Reformas Sociales 
1923, pp. 161-174). 
7. The area of mixed cultivation is converted to specialized crops by dividing it by 
3.6, a coefficient given in the Bulletin de ['office international du vin (hereafter B'OIV) 
(1951, no. 240, p. 7) and used throughout this paper. 
8. "Hybrids" were vines planted directly, which needed no grafting. 
9. By the early 1950s about 10 percent of all French wines belonged to an 
appellation controlie (ADC), with smaller percentages in Italy and Spain (Lachiver 
1988, p. 584). 
10. Paul (1996, pp. 102 and 105), where the debate over the introduction of hybrids 
is fully covered. 
11. This is equivalent to the output of about one hectare. 
12. For example, in Spain by the early 1950s, crushing by treading had disappeared 
in "almost" all wineries, with the notable exception of sherry making in Jerez de la 
Frontera. 
13. This was true of much of Barcelona in the 1880s, for example. Archivo del Min-
isterio de Agricultura, 81-3. 
14. The literature on the workings of mezzadria is considerable (see for example, 
Biagioli 1987; Galassi 1992: pazzagli 1973). 
15. For viticulture in La Mancha, Simpson (1995, pp. 206-214) and for sharecrop-
ping, Carmona (unpublished). 
16. MAIC (1892, p. xxxiv; MAIC 1914, p. 16), which notes that there was no inter-
cropping (ISTAT 1954). 
17. lnchiesta Parlamentare (1909, Puglie, pp. 442-445). An excellent brief survey 
of this source, and the use of multiple contracts in southern Italy is to be found in 
Galassi and Cohen (1994). 
18. HA (1911, p. 280). In northern Italy a similar institution, the turnario sociale 
dates from slightly later. 
19. In Algeria, by contrast, it was 17 percent. 
20. HA (1915, p. 152). A further 40 cooperative distilleries were also active. The 
cooperative at Bagno a Ripoli was shortlived. 
21. The producer was Jouarres, at Minervois (Barbut, cited in Loubere 1978, 
p. 199). 
22. In Spain, by contrast, a winery with a 20,000 hectoliter capacity was estimate 
to cost two million pesetas, with smaller ones increasing by 15 percent, and larger ones 
falling by the same amount (B'OIV 1952, no. 254, pp. 31-32. 
23. I include Mombaruzzo (Piemonte) among these 12, even though in 1929 and 
1931 it was not active, because it appears in a 1958 list. Sources used are MAIC (1908); 
Friedmann, cited in Clique (1931, pp. 243-245); Po (1931, pp. 37-47); and Cosmo 
(1958, pp. 95-131). 
24. For these five, although cooperatives existed in the same villages in both 1908 
and 1958, the 1958 list fails to provide a date for when the cooperative started. 
25. The state provided 20 percent directly and a loan of 60 percent was available 
from the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole, with members required to find the 
remaining 20 percent, divided according to individual harvest size (Galtier 1958, 
p.346). 
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26. Gide noted in the mid-1920s that a grower with motor transport would be suf-
ficiently wealthy not to have to belong to a cooperative (1926, p. 138), but by the early 
1930s lorries were used to transport grapes from collection points to the cooperative, at 
a distance of 10 or 15 kilometers (Clique 1931, p. 97). 
27. Danish dairy cooperatives were successful because they established trust with 
farmers, which was different for private cooperatives to emulate (it was difficult to 
measure the butterfat content of milk prior to the late 1890s), and because joint owner-
ship could impose discipline on members more easily (see Henriksen 1999, especially 
pp. 66-72). 
28. Average yields in 192211926 were 15 hectoliters in Ciudad Real, and 21 in 
Puglie. 
29. One major exception to this rule was Navarra, the home to 22 percent of 
Spain's wine cooperatives in the early 1950s. The explanation here is a different form 
of clustering, in this case the province had an unusually high level of cooperative activ-
ity in all areas of agriculture (see, especially, Majuelo and Pascual 1991). 
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